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6.  The Trade Off between Supervision Consolidation and Central Bank Involvement: the 
Econometric Analysis 
 
The descriptive analysis conducted in the preceding Section claims that each country has its index 
of concentration of powers of financial supervision, which reaches its maximum level in cases 
where there is a single authority and the minimum when there are more than three supervisors.  
 
We are spontaneously prompted to ask: can common determinants be found in the decisions the 
policymakers in each country have made in recent years to maintain or reform their control 
structure, and then to choose the features of the delegation scheme?  
 
Our response is precisely to regard the supervisory structure with a single or multiple authorities as 
an endogenous variable, determined in turn by the dynamics of other structural, economic and 
institutional variables, which can summarize and explain the political process that leads the 
policymakers in one country to decide to maintain or reform its supervisory structure, and then 
their own delegation scheme. 
 
What are the structural variables that can explain the decisions of national policymakers? 
Policymakers can decide the architecture of controls on the basis of institutional characteristics 
and the economic and financial characteristics of their country. In particular, we can assume that 
the physiognomy of the institutional system, and that of the banking and financial system, are 
relevant in each country. And having identified in the above Section a possible relevance of the 
role the central bank plays in the supervisory regime, it may be interesting to consider this aspect 
as well. 
 
To assess the relationship between the policymakers decisions to determine the financial 
architecture and given country economic and institutional characteristics we can estimate a model 
of the probability of different regime decisions as a function of these structural variables.  
 
In fact the IFAC regimes can be viewed as resulting from a continuous, unobserved variable: the 
optimal degree of financial supervisors concentration. Each IFAC regime corresponds to a 
specific range of the optimal financial supervisors concentration, with higher discrete IFAC values 
corresponding to a higher range of financial concentration values. Since the IFAC is a qualitative 
ordinal variable, the estimation of a model for such a dependent variable necessitates the use of a 
specific  technique. 
 
Our qualitative dependent variable can be classified into more than two categories, given that  the 
FAC Index is a polychotomous variable. But the FAC Index is also an ordinal variable, given that 
it reflects a ranking.  Then the ordered multinomial model can be use for estimation in a context of 
an ordinal polychotomous variable78. 
 
Let assume the unobserved continuous variable, the optimal degree of financial supervisors 
concentration, y*, is a linear function of a set of explanatory variables x, with parameter vector b , 
and an error term e:  
 
y*=b’ x + e 
                                                 
78 For further details on the ordinal polychotomous variable estimation see Wooldrige (2002). 
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As usual, y* is unobserved. What is observed are the choice of every policymaker to maintain or to 
reform the financial supervisory architecture: this choice is summarize in the value of the FAC 
Index. Given that  the FAC Index range from zero to seven: 
 
 y = 0  if y* £ m1 
 
y= 1 if  m1 £ y* £ m2 
 
-------- 
 
y=7  if   m7  £ y*  
 
 The ms are unknown partition boundaries (or cut points) that define the ranges of the FAC Index; 
these parameters must be estimated in conjunction with the b  vector. Estimation proceeds by 
maximum likelihood, assuming that e is normally distributed across countries observations, and 
the mean and variance of e are normalized to zero and one. This model can be estimated with an 
ordered probit model or with a ordered logit model79.  
 
We have first produced an econometric analysis of the Probit type: the dependant variable is the 
FAC Index, while the independent regressors proved are a broad set of economic, financial and 
political  variables,  based both on our own assessment of variables that could play a significant 
role in explaining the financial regime, and on data availability. The selected sample is the broader 
one, represented by 68 countries80. 
 
As it has claimed above, no theory exists on the relationships between politics and financial 
supervisory architecture. Therefore we try to test the more general hypotheses.  
 
First, the policy maker choices in order to maintain or to reform the financial supervisory 
architecture could be depended on the structure of the financial systems itself. In the modern 
debate on financial structure, it’s usual to confront the equity dominance model (or market based 
regime) with the bank dominance model (or bank based regime). Furthermore, recent literature 
pointed out the close relationship, in every country,  between the financial structure model   and 
corporate  governance model, with a particular attention to the relative political determinants.81 
Therefore, the first relevant question is: does the financial structure model (i.e. the private 
governance model) (private governance factor) matter in defining the policy maker choices on the 
level of concentration in the supervisory structure?  
 
The expected sign of the relationship between the degree of supervision consolidation and the 
private governance factor is undermined. In Section Two we stressed the importance of  blurring 
process for the banking and the financial market worldwide. The blurring process means potential 
                                                 
79 The maximum likelihood estimations were carried out by a packaged ordered probit and ordered logit commands in 
STATA. 
80 Initially we drop the peculiar case of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), that only on 1 October 2002, after 
the merger with the Board of the Commissioners of the Currency,  became a central bank. The nature of exception of 
Singapore is stressed in De Luna Martinez and Rose (2001). We have to note also that in Ireland in May 2003 the 
Department of  Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) responsibilities on insurance sector were attributed to the 
Irish Central Bank.  In any case we perform the econometric analyses considering also these cases (see above). 
81 Pagano and Volpin (2000), Perotti and Von Thadden (2003). 
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changes in the nature and in the dimensions of intermediaries (the financial conglomerates effect). 
In a bank based regime, if we think that the policy  makers choices depend on the features of  their 
own regime, we can suppose a positive relationships between the  kind of regime  and the degree 
of financial supervision consolidation, in face of the financial conglomerates effect.  At the same 
time, however, the blurring effects means potential changes in the nature  and in the dimensions of 
the financial markets (the securitisation effects). Therefore, also in a market based regime, we can  
expect a positive relationships between the kind of  regime nature and the degree of financial 
supervision consolidation, in face of the securitisation effect. 
 
Second, ,  the institutional environment (i.e. the public governance climate) determines the ability 
of the policy makers to implement their choices.  Then the second relevant question is: does the 
quality of the public governance (public governance factor) matter in defining the policy maker 
choices on the level of concentration in the supervisory structure?  
 
Also the expected sign of the relationship between the degree of supervision consolidation and the 
public governance factor is undermined. In Section II we note that a policy maker, whatever is the 
financial regime of his country,  can choose a higher degree of supervision in order to improve the 
capacity to face the challenges proposed by the blurring process. Then we can suppose a positive 
relationships between good governance indicators and financial supervision consolidation. But, at 
the same time, a policy maker can prefer a single financial agency in order to increase his 
probability to capture the financial supervisory structure. Therefore we could  also expect a 
positive relationships between bad governance indicators and the financial supervision 
consolidation.   
 
Finally, given the above descriptive analyses, we conclude our search for the explanatory variables 
by using the CBFA Index. The political choice of the optimal level of  financial supervisors 
concentration could be depended  on the role of central bank in the financial architecture. The third 
relevant question is: does the degree of  central bank presence (central bank factor) in the financial 
supervision matter in defining the level of concentration in the supervisory structure? Given the 
descriptive analysis developed  in the above Section  and the two possible explanations – the 
blurring hazard effect and the monopolistic bureau effect - the expected sign of the relationship 
between central bank involvement and financial supervision consolidation is negative. 
 
In Masciandaro and Porta (2003) we  obtained as best specification the Equation (1):  
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Where the independent variables are the following:  
 
1. CBFA Index is the indicator of involvement of the bank in supervision, defined in the 
above Section;  
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2. MvBdum Index (Market vs Bank Index): is a structural indicator (dummy) that expresses the 
financial system model of a given country, market-based versus bank-based, constructed on the 
basis of the indices created by Demigüç-Kunt and Levine. 82 
 
4. mcap = Market capitaliza tion/GDP 83, it shows a measure of the securities market size, relative 
to the GDP. 
  
5. goodgov = Good Governance, it  shows the structural capacity of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies. The index is build using all the indicators proposed by Kaufmann et 
al.(2003)84.  They define (public) governance  as the exercise of authority through formal and 
informal traditions and institutions for the common good, thus encompassing: 1) the process of 
selecting, monitoring and replacing governments; 2) the capacity to formulate and implement 
sound policies and deliver public services; 3) the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Furthermore, for 
measurement and analysis purposes, these three dimensions of  governance can be further 
unbundled to comprise two measurable concepts per each of the dimensions above for a total of 
six components: 1) voice and external accountability; 2) political stability and lack of violence; 3) 
government effectiveness; 4) lack of regulatory burden; 5) rule of law; 6) control of corruption. 
The authors present a set of estimates of these six dimensions of governance for four time periods: 
1996,1998,2000,2002.  For every country, therefore,  first we calculate  the mean of the four time 
values for each dimension of governance; then we build up an index of global  good governance in 
the period 1996-2002, calculating the mean of the six different dimensions. 
 
The estimation results of Equation (1) are reported in the first column, Table 4. Second column of 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the same Equation (1) using an ordered Logit model. Note 
that the impact of a change in an explanatory variables on the estimated probabilities of the highest 
and lowest of the order classifications – in our case the Single  Authority model and the “pure” 
Multi Supervisory model – is unequivocal:   if bj  is positive, for example, an increase in the value 
of  xj increases the probability of having the Single Authority model, while decreases the 
probability of having the “pure” Multi Supervisory model. 
                                                 
82 Demigüç-Kunt  and Levine (1999).  
83 World Bank, 2001, World Development Indicators, Stock Markets 5.3. 
84 Kaufmann, Kaan and Mastruzzi (2003). 
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TABLE 4: ORDERED PROBIT AND LOGIT ESTIMATES  
 
 VARIABLES probit  logit 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE FAC  FAC 
 CBFA 
 
Coefficient b2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
- 0.94 
(0.23) 
0.00*** 
 
  
 
-1.61 
(0.43) 
      0.00*** 
 MvBdum 
 
Coefficient b3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.70 
(0.37) 
0.05* 
  
 
1.39 
(0.66) 
0.03* 
 mcap 
 
Coefficient b5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
- 0.62 
(0.26) 
0.02** 
 
  
 
-1.15 
(0.46) 
0.01*** 
 goodgov 
 
Coefficient b6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.88 
(0.22) 
0.00*** 
  
 
1.56 
(0.40) 
0.00*** 
 No of observations 68  68 
 LR chi2(5) 39.53  40.46 
 Prob>chi2 0.00  0.00 
 Pseudo R2 0.17  0.17 
 Log Likelihood -93.07  -92.60 
     
Note:*** indicates statistical significance at one percent; :** indicates statistical significance 
at three percent; :* indicates statistical significance at five percent 
 
 
These first econometric results seem interesting. The probability that a country will move toward a 
Single Authority model , is higher: 1)The lower the involvement of the central bank in these 
powers; 2) The smaller the financial system85; 3) the more equity dominated the private 
governance model;  4)  the more the public governance  is good. 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 If we think  to the sample of  the countries  (14) with a Single Supervisor only, the UK seems to be the exception in 
the inverse relationship  between the degree of financial supervision consolidation and the financial market dimension. 
In fact if  the same regressions are performed without the UK – Annex II, Table 8  – all the results are confirmed, with a 
bit improvement. If we include Singapore, using  the post 2003 Reform indexes of  FAC and CBFA,  the results  – 
Annex II, Table 9 – on the role of central bank involvement and of the governance are confirmed, while the other 
relationships became weaker. The same if  we consider – Annex II, Table 10 -  Ireland using the post 2003 Reform 
indexes of FAC and CBFA. 
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Now, how should the empirical results be interpreted in terms of  political delegation approach? 
 
The empirical analysis, firstly, seems to suggest that the choices of the policymaker in terms of 
“whom” to delegate the supervisory policy to are closely linked to those regarding “ how many” 
institutions to delegate, according to an inverse relationship. In particular, the more the central bank 
is involved in financial supervisory powers, the lower the degree of unification of those powers is 
likely to be86. The first econometric analysis confirms the descriptive  trade off between supervision 
consolidation and central bank involvement., that can be explain by the existence of a blurring 
hazard effect, and/or a monopolistic bureau effect. 
 
Secondly, the choice of the degree of unification of supervisory powers seems to be influenced 
especially by the characteristics of the financial markets: more specifically, the smaller these 
markets, the more likely it seems that the probability of unification will increase, perhaps 
confirming the hypothesis of policymakers conditioned by the “small country” situation illustrated 
earlier.  
 
Furthermore, a positive relationship between the market based regime and the degree of supervision 
consolidation seems to hold87. This fact could be explained by the focus of policymakers on the role 
of financial conglomerates, if there were evidence of a positive relationship between the degree of 
financial deepening  and development of cross- sector intermediaries. The  policymakers, in face of 
the possible effects of the growing presence of the financial conglomerates, prefer to increase the 
degree of consolidation in the supervision structure- Alternatively, the policymakers  might be 
sensitive to the preferences of a highly concentrated banking and financial industry that appreciates 
a single supervisor (captive hypothesis). 
 
Thirdly, the choice of policymakers to establish an unification of supervisory powers seems to be 
facilitated by an institutional environment characterized by good governance88. The relationship 
between good governance and supervision unification process can be explain if we suppose that a 
policymaker which care about the soundness and the efficiency can prefer the single financial 
authority as the optimal one in face of the blurring challenges. 
 
Another hypothesis is that , in reality, good governance could be just a proxy of more deeper 
institutional factors, and so we do a further step: How robust are the results obtained thus far? To 
answer this question, we have attempted to insert control variables into the estimates. 
 
Firstly, based on the descriptive analyses, we asked ourselves whether the choices of policymakers 
to increase the degree of concentration of supervisory powers might depend on the level of 
development in their respective countries. The geographical factor might also be important, in terms 
of membership, actual or potential, in the European Union. 
 
Secondly, the relationship between the degree of concentration and the characteristics of the 
banking and financial markets might “obscure” the importance of other institutiona l variables, 
                                                 
86 At the same time, the variables that could explain the degree of central bank involvement in the financial supervision 
does not coincide with those that we use to analyze the degree of  consolidation; in fact if  you perform Probit and Logit 
regressions – Annex II, Table 11A and 11B – using CBFA as dependent variable and the same vector of financial and 
institutional variables, the result are not significant at all. 
87 Note that the correlation index between the financial regime variable (MvBdum) and the market capitalization 
variable ( mcap) is high (…), but they influence the dependent variable with opposite sign. 
88  All the three main results  are confirmed if the FAC Two Index is used instead of FAC Index, as indicator of 
supervision consolidation. See Annex II, Table 12. 
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themselves determinants in explaining the characteristics of the banking and financial markets89. 
Recently, the structure of the financial markets was explained with three different approaches90: the 
law and finance view, in the static and dynamic versions; the politics and finance view; and the 
endowment view. In this paper, we have inserted control variables related to the law and finance 
view and the endowment view, while the politics and finance view was already represented by the 
indicator of governance. Furthermore, the same institutional  variables can explained the significant 
role of the good governance variable in Equation (1).  
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the probit and logit estimates with the inclusion of control variables. The 
results of the estimates, with the control variables inserted, show an improvement in their fitness 
and the robustness of at least two results. First  the  probability of a single financial authority  is 
still inversely and significantly related  to the involvement of the central bank. Second, the 
concentration of powers also seems to be linked to the institutional framework, especially to the 
Germanic and Scandinavian roots of the legal institutions. These results are confirmed with 
different samples too91, as Tables from A to D shown. 
 
 
                                                 
89 For example, in Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2003) regulation become insignificant in explain banking 
performances when controlling for institutional indicators. 
90 Different approaches have been proposed to explain the country choice between bank based model and market based 
model:  the “legal approach”, (La Porta, Lopez –de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998); the “economic 
approach”(Rajan and Zingales, 2000); the “political economy approach” (Pagano and Volpin 2000, Verdier 2001, 
Rosenbluth and Schaap, 2001, Carney 2002, Perotti and von Thadden ,2003). 
91 If  the same regressions are performed without the UK – Annex II, Table 13  – all the results are confirmed. If we 
include Singapore, using  the post 2003 Reform indexes of  FAC and CBFA,  the results  – Annex II, Table 9 – on the 
role of the rules of law are confirmed, while the other relationships became weaker. The same if  we consider – Annex 
II, Table 10 -  Ireland using the post 2003 Reform indexes of FAC and CBFA. Finally all the  results  are  completely 
confirmed if the FAC Two Index is used instead of FAC Index, as indicator of supervision consolidation. See Annex II, 
Table 16. 
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TABLE 6: ORDERED PROBIT  ESTIMATES WITH CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
 VARIABLES probit  I II III IV 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC FAC FAC FAC 
 CBFA 
 
Coefficient b2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
- 0.94 
(0.23) 
0.00*** 
 
  
 
-0.95 
(0.23) 
0.00*** 
 
 
 
-0.96 
(0.23) 
0.00*** 
 
 
-0.91 
(0.26) 
0.00*** 
 
 
-0.88 
(0.26) 
0.00*** 
 MvBdum 
 
Coefficient b3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.70 
(0.37) 
0.05* 
  
 
0.71 
(0.37) 
0.05* 
 
 
 
0.70 
(0.37) 
0.06 
 
 
0.38 
(0.41) 
0.35 
 
 
0.43 
(0.42) 
0.30 
 mcap 
 
Coefficient b5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
- 0.62 
(0.27) 
0.02** 
 
  
 
- 0.61 
(0.27) 
0.02** 
 
 
- 0.60 
(0.28) 
0.03** 
 
 
- 0.52 
(0.30) 
0.08 
 
 
- 0.53 
(0.30) 
0.07 
 
 goodgov 
 
Coefficient b6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.88 
(0.22) 
0.00*** 
  
 
0.92 
(0.32) 
0.00*** 
 
 
0.89 
(0.35) 
0.01*** 
 
 
0.66 
(0.39) 
0.09 
 
 
0.61 
(0.40) 
0.12 
 Gnpcapita 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
   
-.000000431 
(0.0000230) 
0.85 
 
-0.00000372 
(0.0000232) 
0.87 
 
-0.0000346 
(0.0000259) 
0.18 
 
 
-0.0000301 
(0.0000270) 
0.26 
 EU membership 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
    
0.07 
(0.32) 
0.81 
 
0.79 
(0.43) 
0.07 
 
 
0.82 
(0.44) 
0.06*                
 
 Anglo Saxon Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
     
1.05 
(0.55) 
0.05* 
 
0.99 
(0.55) 
0.07 
 French Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
     
0.96 
(0.46) 
0.04* 
 
0.87 
(0.48) 
0.07 
 German Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
     
3.44 
(1.08) 
 
3.41 
(1.07) 
 28 
P >z 
 
0.00*** 0.00*** 
 Scandinavian Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
    2.61 
(0.87) 
0.00*** 
2.60 
(0.87) 
0.00*** 
 Latitude 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
      
-0.26 
(0.45) 
0.55 
 No of observations 68  68 68 68 68 
 LR chi2(5) 39.53  39.57 39.62 54.93 55.28 
 Prob>chi2 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Pseudo R2 0.17  0.17 0.17 0.25 0.24 
 Log Likelihood -93.07  -93.05 -93.02 -85.73 -85.19 
 
Note:*** indicates statistical significance at one percent; :** indicates statistical significance 
at three percent; :* indicates statistical significance at five percent 
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TABLE 7: ORDERED LOGIT  ESTIMATES WITH CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
 VARIABLES logit  I II III IV 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC FAC FAC FAC 
 CBFA 
 
Coefficient b2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-1.61 
(0.43) 
(0.00)***   
  
 
-1.61 
(0.43) 
      (0.00)*** 
 
 
-1.60 
(0.44) 
      (0.00)*** 
 
 
-1.57 
(0.46) 
      (0.00)*** 
 
 
-1.50 
(0.48) 
      (0.00)*** 
 MvBdum 
 
Coefficient b3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
1.39 
(0.66) 
0.03** 
  
 
1.39 
(0.66) 
0.03** 
 
 
1.40 
(0.68) 
0.04* 
 
 
0.91 
(0.74) 
0.33 
 
 
1.01 
(0.77) 
0.18 
 mcap 
 
Coefficient b5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
-1.15 
(0.46) 
0.01*** 
  
 
-1.15 
(0.47) 
0.01*** 
 
 
-1.16 
(0.48) 
0.01*** 
 
 
-1.11 
(0.55) 
0.04* 
 
 
-1.12 
(0.54) 
0.04* 
 goodgov 
 
Coefficient b6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
1.56 
(0.40) 
0.00*** 
  
 
1.54 
(0.58) 
0.00*** 
 
 
1.56 
(0.63) 
0.01*** 
 
 
1.08 
(0.66) 
0.10 
 
 
0.99 
(0.67) 
0.14 
 Gnpcapita 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
   
0.000000127 
(0.0000445) 
0.97 
 
0.000000953 
(0.0000400) 
0.98 
 
-0.0000500 
(0.0000468) 
0.28 
 
-0.0000421 
(0.0000486) 
0.38 
 EU membership 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
    
0.04 
(0.57) 
0.94 
 
1.32 
(0.78) 
0.09 
 
1.34 
(0.79) 
0.08 
 Anglo Saxon Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
     
2.05 
(1.01) 
0.04* 
 
1.93 
(1.03) 
0.06 
 French Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
     
1.85 
(0.93) 
0.02** 
 
1.69 
(0.87) 
0.05* 
 German Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
     
5.76 
(1.91) 
0.00*** 
 
5.69 
(1.91) 
0.00*** 
 
 Scandinavian Law       
 30 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
4.45 
(1.55) 
0.00*** 
4.44 
(1.56) 
0.00*** 
 
 Latitude 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
      
-0.44 
(0.74) 
0.55 
 No of observations 68  68 68 68 68 
 LR chi2(5) 40.46  40.46 40.47 54.84 55.19 
 Prob>chi2 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Pseudo R2 0.17  0.17 0.17 0.24 0.24 
 Log Likelihood -92.60  -92.60 -92.60 -85.41 -85.24 
 
Note:*** indicates statistical significance at one percent; :** indicates statistical significance 
at three percent; :* indicates statistical significance at five percent 
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TABLE A: ORDERED PROBIT  ESTIMATES : SUMMARY 
 
 VARIABLES 68 
countries 
 Without 
UK 
With  
Singapore 
2003 
With 
Sing. & Ire. 
2003 
68 
countries 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC FAC FAC FAC TWO 
 CBFA 
 
Coefficient b2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
- 0.94 
(0.23) 
0.00*** 
 
  
 
- 0.93 
(0.23) 
0.00*** 
 
 
 
- 0.60 
(0.20) 
0.00*** 
 
 
 
- 0.44 
(0.18) 
0.01*** 
 
 
 
- 0.92 
(0.23) 
0.00*** 
 
 MvBdum 
 
Coefficient b3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.70 
(0.37) 
0.05* 
  
 
0.71 
(0.37) 
0.05* 
 
 
0.64 
(0.36) 
0.07 
 
 
0.58 
(0.36) 
0.11 
 
 
0.59 
(0.37) 
0.10 
 mcap 
 
Coefficient b5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
- 0.62 
(0.26) 
0.02** 
 
  
 
- 0.66 
(0.27) 
0.01**** 
 
 
 
- 0.45 
(0.26) 
0.07 
 
 
 
- 0.47 
(0.26) 
0.06 
 
 
 
- 0.59 
(0.27) 
0.02** 
 
 goodgov 
 
Coefficient b6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.88 
(0.22) 
0.00*** 
  
 
0.88 
(0.22) 
0.00*** 
 
 
0.86 
(0.21) 
0.00*** 
 
 
0.47 
(0.21) 
0.00*** 
 
 
0.74 
(0.21) 
0.00*** 
 No of observations 68  67 69 69 68 
 LR chi2(5) 39.53  37.90 32.47 29.13 32.74 
 Prob>chi2 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Pseudo R2 0.17  0.17 0.14 0.12 0.17 
 Log Likelihood -93.07  -92.16 -98.22 -98.92 -78.10 
 
Note:*** indicates statistical significance at one percent; :** indicates statistical significance 
at three percent; :* indicates statistical significance at five percent 
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TABLE B: ORDERED LOGIT  ESTIMATES: SUMMARY 
 
 VARIABLES 68 
countries 
 Without 
UK 
With  
Singapore 
2003 
With 
Sing. & Ire. 
2003 
68 
countries 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC FAC FAC FAC 
 CBFA 
 
Coefficient b2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-1.61 
(0.43) 
0.00***      
  
 
-1.59 
(0.43) 
      0.00*** 
 
 
-1.14 
(0.39) 
      0.00*** 
 
 
-0.88 
(0.38) 
      0.02** 
 
 
-1.55 
(0.42) 
      0.00*** 
 MvBdum 
 
Coefficient b3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
1.39 
(0.66) 
0.03* 
  
 
1.39 
(0.65) 
0.03* 
 
 
1.31 
(0.64) 
0.04* 
 
 
1.21 
(0.63) 
0.05* 
 
 
1.18 
(0.66) 
0.07 
 mcap 
 
Coefficient b5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
-1.15 
(0.46) 
0.01*** 
  
 
-1.21 
(0.47) 
0.01*** 
 
 
-0.91 
(0.45) 
0.04* 
 
 
-0.86 
(0.44) 
0.05* 
 
 
-1.13 
(0.47) 
0.01*** 
 goodgov 
 
Coefficient b6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
1.56 
(0.40) 
0.00*** 
  
 
1.56 
(0.40) 
0.00*** 
 
 
1.49 
(0.38) 
0.00*** 
 
 
1.47 
(0.38) 
0.00*** 
 
 
1.38 
(0.40) 
0.00*** 
 No of observations 68  67 69 69 68 
 LR chi2(5) 40.46  38.86 34.59 30.99 33.46 
 Prob>chi2 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Pseudo R2 0.17  0.17 0.15 0.13 0.17 
 Log Likelihood -92.60  -91.72 -97.16 -99.99 -77.74 
        
 
Note:*** indicates statistical significance at one percent; :** indicates statistical significance 
at three percent; :* indicates statistical significance at five percent 
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TABLE C: ORDERED PROBIT  ESTIMATES WITH CONTROL VARIABLES: 
SUMMARY 
 
 VARIABLES 68 
countries 
 Without 
UK 
With  
Singapore 
2003 
With 
Sing. & 
Ire. 
2003 
68 
countries 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC FAC FAC FAC FAC TWO 
 CBFA 
 
Coefficient b2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.91 
(0.26) 
0.00*** 
 
 
- 0.85 
(0.26) 
0.00*** 
 
 
 
- 0.44 
(0.21) 
0.04* 
 
 
 
- 0.30 
(0.20) 
0.14 
 
 
 
- 0.98 
(0.26) 
0.00*** 
 
 MvBdum 
 
Coefficient b3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.38 
(0.41) 
0.35 
 
 
0.43 
(0.41) 
0.30 
 
 
0.48 
(0.41) 
0.24 
 
 
0.38 
(0.41) 
0.34 
 
 
0.19 
(0.42) 
0.63 
 mcap 
 
Coefficient b5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
- 0.52 
(0.30) 
0.08 
 
 
- 0.59 
(0.30) 
0.05* 
 
 
 
- 0.37 
(0.29) 
0.19 
 
 
 
- 0.39 
(0.29) 
0.17 
 
 
 
- 0.40 
(0.29) 
0.18 
 
 goodgov 
 
Coefficient b6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.66 
(0.39) 
0.09 
 
 
0.71 
(0.39) 
0.07 
 
 
0.82 
(0.38) 
0.03* 
 
 
0.78 
(0.38) 
0.03* 
 
 
0.43 
(0.38) 
0.26 
 Gnpcapita 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.0000346 
(0.0000259) 
0.18 
 
 
- 0.0000364 
(0.0000260) 
0.16 
 
- 0.0000335 
(0.0000254) 
0.43 
 
- 0.0000293 
(0.0000254) 
0.24 
 
- 0.0000304 
(0.0000252) 
0.22 
 EU membership 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
0.79 
(0.43) 
0.07 
 
 
0.67 
(0.44) 
0.16 
 
0.31 
(0.40) 
0.43 
 
0.37 
(0.41) 
0.36 
 
1.02 
(0.43) 
0.01*** 
 Anglo Saxon Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
1.05 
(0.55) 
0.05* 
 
0.91 
(0.55) 
0.10 
 
0.59 
(0.52) 
0.25 
 
0.68 
(0.53) 
0.19 
 
1.15 
(0.55) 
0.03** 
 French Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
0.96 
(0.46) 
0.04* 
 
0.93 
(0.46) 
0.04*         
 
.56 
(0.44) 
0.20         
 
0.60 
(0.44) 
0.17         
 
0.79 
(0.46) 
0.09         
 German Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
3.44 
(1.08) 
0.00*** 
 
3.51 
(1.09) 
0.00*** 
 
2.64 
(0.99) 
0.00*** 
 
2.72 
(1.00) 
0.00*** 
 
2.66 
(0.90) 
0.00*** 
 34 
 
 Scandinavian Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
2.61 
(0.87) 
0.00*** 
 
2.75 
(0.88) 
0.00*** 
 
2.18 
(0.84) 
0.01*** 
 
2.21 
(0.84) 
0.00*** 
 
1.97 
(0.80) 
0.01** 
 No of observations 68 67 69 69 68 
 LR chi2(5) 54.93 54.65 44.06 40.83 44.31 
 Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Pseudo R2 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.23 
 Log Likelihood -85.73 -83.82 -92.43 -93.07 - 72.31 
       
 
Note:*** indicates statistical significance at one percent; :** indicates statistical significance 
at three percent; :* indicates statistical significance at five percent 
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TABLE D: ORDERED LOGIT  ESTIMATES WITH CONTROL VARIABLES: 
SUMMARY 
 
 VARIABLES 68 
countries 
 Without 
UK 
With  
Singapore 
2003 
With 
Sing. & Ire. 
2003 
68 
countries 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC FAC FAC FAC FAC 
 CBFA 
 
Coefficient b2 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.91 
(0.26) 
0.00*** 
 
 
-1.48 
(0.47) 
0.00*** 
 
 
 
-0.99 
(0.42) 
0.02** 
 
 
 
- 0.73 
(0.43) 
0.07 
 
 
 
- 1.69 
(0.49) 
0.00*** 
 
 MvBdum 
 
Coefficient b3 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.38 
(0.41) 
0.35 
 
 
1.00 
(0.75) 
0.18 
 
 
 
1.01 
(0.72) 
0.16 
 
 
 
0.92 
(0.77) 
0.20 
 
 
 
0.49 
(0.75) 
0.51 
 
 mcap 
 
Coefficient b5 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
- 0.52 
(0.30) 
0.08 
 
 
- 1.25 
(0.56) 
0.02** 
 
 
- 0.89 
(0.52) 
0.08 
 
 
- 0.87 
(0.51) 
0.09 
 
 
- 0.89 
(0.53) 
0.09 
 goodgov 
 
Coefficient b6 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
 
0.66 
(0.39) 
0.09 
 
 
1.16 
(0.66) 
0.08 
 
 
1.21 
(0.65) 
0.06 
 
 
1.19 
(0.65) 
0.07 
 
 
0.73 
(0.67) 
0.27 
 Gnpcapita 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
-0.0000346 
(0.0000259) 
0.18 
 
 
-0.0000521 
(0.0000480) 
0.27 
 
- 0.0000469 
(0.0000452) 
0.29 
 
- 0.0000422 
(0.0000451) 
0.34 
 
- 0.0000476 
(0.0000451) 
0.29 
 EU membership 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
0.79 
(0.43) 
0.07 
 
 
1.11 
(0.79) 
0.15 
 
0.69 
(0.75) 
0.35 
 
0.62 
(0.75) 
0.40 
 
1.79 
(0.80) 
0.02** 
 Anglo Saxon Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
1.05 
(0.55) 
0.05* 
 
1.82 
(1.01) 
0.07 
 
1.57 
(0.96) 
0.10 
 
1.55 
(0.96) 
0.10 
 
2.23 
(1.03) 
0.03** 
 French Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
0.96 
(0.46) 
0.04* 
 
1.83 
(0.83) 
0.02** 
 
1.34 
(0.79) 
0.09 
 
1.30 
(0.79) 
0.10 
 
1.51 
(0.82) 
0.06 
 German Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
 
3.44 
(1.08) 
0.00*** 
 
5.92 
(1.94) 
0.00*** 
 
4.70 
(1.79) 
0.00*** 
 
4.58 
(1.79) 
0.00*** 
 
4.74 
(1.63) 
0.00*** 
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 Scandinavian Law 
Coefficient b 
Std. Error 
P >z 
 
2.61 
(0.87) 
0.00*** 
 
4.71 
(1.57) 
0.00*** 
 
3.92 
(1.51) 
0.01** 
 
3.83 
(1.50) 
0.01*** 
 
3.52 
(1.45) 
0.01*** 
 No of observations 68 67 69 69 68 
 LR chi2(5) 54.93 54.64 46.10 42.30 44.86 
 Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Pseudo R2 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.23 
 Log Likelihood -85.73 -83.82 -91.41 - 92.34 - 72.04 
 
Note:*** indicates statistical significance at one percent; :** indicates statistical significance 
at three percent; :* indicates statistical significance at five percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
